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ABSTRACT
When an employee participating in an ERISA benefit plan files a claim,
someone must determine whether the assets of the plan will be used to pay the claim
or whether the claim will be denied. The employer either makes the decision or
delegates it to a plan administrator. If the claim is denied, ERISA permits the
employee to sue, but does not specify who may be named a defendant. The federal
circuit courts are split three ways on the issue. First, some courts hold that only the
plan itself may be named as a defendant. Second, other courts hold that both the
plan and the plan administrator may be named as defendants. Third, still other
courts hold that both the plan and the employer may be named as defendants. This
Article argues that courts should permit suit against any entity that played a role in
denying the claim. This approach (1) is consistent with the plain language of ERISA;
(2) is consistent with the legislative intent behind ERISA of protecting employees
from under-funded plans and erroneous benefit denials; (3) is consistent with
Supreme Court precedent permitting fiduciaries to be sued under ERISA; and (4)
creates an incentive for entities making benefits determinations to make those
determinations correctly.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Bob awoke in the middle of the night to sounds of someone breaking into
his home. The intruder attacked Bob, and he was rushed to the hospital where he
stayed for a number of days due to extensive injuries. When Bob finally left the
hospital, he was unable to work for six months. Bob is an employee of Company A,
which offers its employees the opportunity to participate in healthcare benefits and
long-term disability programs. Bob has contributed to each of these programs
during his employment. The hospital submits Bob‟s bills to Company B, which
administers the healthcare and disability plans for Company A. Simultaneously, Bob
also applies for disability benefits. Payment of the hospital bills and the claim for
disability benefits are both denied. Bob must now deal with unpaid hospital bills;
however, he has no income. Bob wants to sue.
Congress gave Bob the ability to sue over the denial of his claims under the
Employment Retirement Insurance Security Act, commonly known as ERISA.1 If
Bob files a claim under ERISA, the leading question becomes who is the proper
defendant in Bob‟s suit: the plan itself; his employer, Company A; the Plan
Administrator, Company B; or a combination of the three. Federal circuit courts
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [ERISA], Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
1
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have taken three different approaches in answering this question. First, the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits hold that the only proper defendant is the plan itself. 2 These
courts reason that because the plain language of the statute only provides for an
individual to recover benefits against the plan as an entity, the plan is the only proper
defendant.3 Second, the Third and Sixth Circuits hold that the employer can also be
brought in as a defendant in certain cases.4 These courts reason that an employer is a
proper defendant when the employer acted as a fiduciary or retained control and
authority over decisions involving the plan and distribution of benefits. 5 The Eighth
and Eleventh Circuits hold that the plan administrator can be brought into a suit as a
defendant.6 These courts reason that a plan administrator is a proper party due to
the discretion, responsibility, and control the administrator has over the plan.7
This Article argues that in an ERISA action, a plan participant should be
permitted to name as defendants all parties who played a role in the denial of a claim,
including the plan itself, the employer who sponsored the plan, and the plan
administrator. This approach has four distinct advantages. First, it is consistent with
See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1492 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that,
based on the language of the statute, “[t]he appropriate defendant for a denial of benefits claim would
be the Plan”); Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curium)
(noting that ERISA allows recovery of benefits only against the plan).
2

Jass, 88 F.3d at 1492 (relying on the Ninth Circuit‟s language in Gelardi that ERISA only permits suits
against the plan); Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324 (stating that “ERISA permits suits to recover benefits only
against the Plan as an entity”).
3

See, e.g., Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 234 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that
when an employer acts as plan administrator, it assumes a fiduciary role and becomes subject to
liability under ERISA); Sweet v. Consol. Aluminum Corp., 913 F.2d 268, 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
the employer a proper party in the ERISA suit when it exercised control over the decision to deny
plan benefits).
4

Curcio, 33 F.3d at 234 (stating that “a fiduciary is one that maintains discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of the plan” and that this definition is met when the
employer acts as plan administrator); Sweet, 913 F.2d at 272 (finding an employer a proper party to the
suit when it “had some control in the decision to pay the benefits”).
5

See, e.g., Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding the plan administrator a
proper party to the suit); Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir.
1997) (stating that “[t]he proper party defendant in an action concerning ERISA benefits is the party
that controls administration of the plan”).
6

Layes, 132 F.3d 1246 (stating that the party who controls the administration of the plan is a proper
defendant); Garren, 114 F.3d 187 (same).
7
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the plain language of ERISA explicitly permitting suits against fiduciaries.8 Second, it
is consistent with the legislative intent behind ERISA to protect employees from
improperly funded plans and erroneous benefit denials.9 Third, it is consistent with
the Supreme Court decision in Varity Corp. v. Howe10 recognizing that fiduciaries can
be sued under ERISA.11 Fourth, it creates an incentive for parties making benefits
determinations to make correct decisions.
Part II of this Article explains the legislative reasons for enacting ERISA.
Part III addresses the split among the circuit courts as to who can properly be named
as a defendant in an ERISA action. Part IV argues that allowing others besides the
plan to be named as defendants does more to hold parties responsible for their
actions and is consistent with Supreme Court rulings and the ERISA legislation. Part
V concludes by providing a quick summary.
II. BACKGROUND: § 502 ERISA
A. ERISA Plans
Congress enacted ERISA (the “Act”) in 1974 in an effort to protect
beneficiaries and participants of employee benefit plans, such as long-term disability
plans, health insurance plans, and pension plans.12 These plans have been defined in
section 1002 as:
(1) The terms “employee welfare benefit plan” and “welfare plan”
mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
8

See Curcio, 33 F.3d at 233-34 (providing the statutory definition for fiduciary under ERISA).

ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c) (2000); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (stating
that one purpose of ERISA was “Congress‟ desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their
plans”); H.R. REP. NO. 93-779, at 2 (1974) (“to make sure that those who do participate in such plans
do not lose their benefits as a result of unduly restrictive forfeiture provisions or failure of the plan to
accumulate and retain sufficient funds to meet its obligations”).
9

10

516 U.S. 489.

11

Id. at 503-04.

ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996); Tina Knight
Kukanza, Case Note, Varity Corp. v. Howe: Will It Cause An Increase In Litigation Against Employers
Who Administer ERISA Plans?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 965, 966-67 (1997).
12
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program was established or is maintained for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment . . . .
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the terms “employee
pension benefit plan” and “pension plan” mean any plan, fund, or
program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by
both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of
surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program-(i) provided retirement income to employees . . . .13
The cases described in Part III involve long-term disability, health insurance, and life
insurance policies that fall under the definition of an ERISA plan in section 1002(1).
One case in Part III involves a pension plan that qualifies as an ERISA plan under
section 1002(2).
The statute sets forth standards of conduct, responsibilities and obligations
of fiduciaries and provides appropriate remedies for injured parties, sanctions against
responsible parties, and quicker access to federal courts.14 The legislature intended to
ensure that those who participated in these types of plans received their benefits and
did not lose benefits due to failure of the plan to accumulate and retain sufficient
funds to meet its obligations.15
B. Explanation of Section 502
Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides that “[a] civil action may be brought by a
participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,
13

ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002.

14

ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b); Kukanza, supra note 11, at 966-67.

H.R. REP. NO. 93-779, at 2 (1974) (stating that one purpose of ERISA is “to make sure that those
who do participate in such plans do not lose their benefits as a result of unduly restrictive forfeiture
provisions or failure of the plan to accumulate and retain sufficient funds to meet its obligations”); see
also Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 112 (1989) (“ERISA was passed by Congress in 1974 to
safeguard employees from the abuse and mismanagement of funds that had been accumulated to
finance various types of employee benefits.”).
15
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to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan.”16 This provision refers to the plan but does
not clearly state who may or may not be named as a defendant. Courts stating that
only a plan may be named as a defendant also point to section 502(d)(2). 17 This
provision states that: “[a]ny money judgment under this title against an employee
benefit plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity and shall not be
enforceable against any other person unless liability against such person is established
in his individual capacity under this title.”18 ERISA allows for suit to be brought
against a fiduciary under section 409(a) which states:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such
plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to
restore to such plans any profits of such fiduciary which have been
made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be
subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may
deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.19
Fiduciary is defined in section 1002(21)(A):
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a
fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any
authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan.20

16

ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).

17

See infra Part III.A.

18

ERISA § 502(d)(2).

19

ERISA § 409(a).

20

ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
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Section 404(a) of ERISA requires a fiduciary to “discharge his duties with respect to
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”21
In Varity Corp. v. Howe,22 the Supreme Court held that a party determined to
be a fiduciary can be liable to a plaintiff for individualized equitable relief for breach
of fiduciary duties.23 In Varity, the employer deliberately deceived the plan
beneficiaries into believing their benefits would be safe if they switched employers,
and thus benefit plans, to a newly established subsidiary of the company.24 The
Court interpreted the scope of fiduciary activity by defining what constituted
discretionary acts of plan “management” and “administration.”25 The Court looked
to trust law and what it meant to have fiduciary administration over a trust. 26 Under
the law of trusts, a fiduciary is one who has the powers “necessary or appropriate for
carrying out the purposes of a trust.”27 The Court applied this definition of a
fiduciary to an ERISA claim.28
Next, the Court addressed whether the employer‟s actions met the statutory
definition of fiduciary acts.29 To enable beneficiaries to make informed choices
about their continued participation in the plan, the employer provided detailed
information regarding the likely future of their plan benefits.30 The Court found that
conveying this information was “an exercise of a power „appropriate‟ to carrying out

21

ERISA § 404(a).

22

516 U.S. 489 (1996).

23

Id. at 515.

24

Id. at 493-94, 501.

25

Id. at 502.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 502-03.

30

Id. at 501, 502.
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an important plan purpose.”31 Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the
District Court‟s conclusion that the employer was a fiduciary.32
Having determined that the employer was acting as a fiduciary, the Court
examined whether the employer breached its fiduciary duty.33 The Court noted that
ERISA section 404(a) “requires a „fiduciary‟ to „discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the plan‟s participants and beneficiaries.‟”34 Contrary to
this section‟s requirements, the Court found that the employer “knowingly and
significantly” deceived the “plan‟s beneficiaries in order to save the employer
money” and therefore failed to act in the sole interest of the beneficiaries.35 Because
“lying is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by [the fiduciary,]” the Court
upheld the lower court‟s conclusion that the employer breached its fiduciary duty.36
The Third Circuit held in Curcio v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.37 that
ERISA broadly defines a fiduciary.38 The court stated that ERISA makes clear that a
fiduciary is one who “maintains discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility
in the administration of the plan.”39 The broader a court defines the term fiduciary,
the more likely it is a defendant will be found to be a fiduciary and the plaintiff will
be able to recover.
III. WHO CAN BE NAMED AS A DEFENDANT?
Six of the federal circuit courts have addressed, with varying results, the
question of who to name as a defendant in an ERISA claim. The Seventh and Ninth
31

Id. at 502.

32

Id. at 503.

33

Id. at 506.

34

Id. (quoting ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000)).

35

Id.

36

Id. at 506.

37

33 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 1994).

38

Id. at 233.

39

Id. at 234.

2008]

NAMING A DEFENDANT IN AN ERISA ACTION

325

Circuits have taken a strict interpretation of the statutory language in ERISA and
held that only the plan itself may be named as a defendant.40 The Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits have held that a plan administrator can also be named as a
defendant due to the control it has over the distribution of benefits under a plan.41
The Third and Sixth Circuits have held that an employer can be named as a
defendant due to the fiduciary relationship that exists between the employer and the
employee.42
A. Only the Plan Can Be Named
In Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp.,43 the Ninth Circuit held that ERISA permits
suits only against the plan.44 Joyce Gelardi, an employee of Pertec Computer
Corporation (“Pertec”), submitted a claim for long-term disability benefits to her
employer.45 The plan under which she submitted her claim qualified as a self-funded
employee welfare benefit plan as defined by ERISA.46 Pertec hired a third party, Self
Insurance Programs (“Self”), to be the plan administrator and have control over the
plan.47 Pertec was listed as the plan fiduciary in the plan summary.48 Self initially
denied Gelardi‟s benefits claim,49 and had self delegated authority to the Pertec
Employee Benefits Committee to review denied claims.50 The Committee upheld
the denial in this case.51 Subsequently, Gelardi brought suit against Pertec and Self,
40

See infra Part III.A.

41

See infra Part III.B.

42

See infra Part III.C.

43

761 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1985).

44

Id. at 1324.

45

Id.

46

Id. (citing ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982)).

47

Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324.

48

Id. at 1325.

49

Id. at 1324.

50

Id.

51

Id.
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but did not include the plan itself.52 Because the claim was not brought against the
plan or a fiduciary, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.53
Gelardi appealed.54
In holding that ERISA permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan
itself, the court cited ERISA section 1132(a)(1)(B) and section 1132(d), which both
refer to the plan.55 The court also held that suits for breach of fiduciary duty could
be brought only against the fiduciary and the court cited ERISA section 1109(a) and
section 1105(a) in support of this holding.56 The court stated that it was “self evident
that neither [Pertec nor Self was] the [p]lan itself.”57 As a result, the court examined
whether either party was a fiduciary.58
52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

Id. Section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA states “(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil
action may be brought (1) by a participant or beneficiary . . . (B) to recover benefits due to him under
the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan . . . .” ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000)). Section
1132(d), entitled “status of employee benefit plan as entity” states:
55

(1) An employee benefit plan may sue or be sued under this title as an entity.
Service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of a court upon a trustee or
an administrator of an employee benefit plan in his capacity as such shall constitute
service upon the employee benefit plan. In a case where a plan has not designated
in the summary plan description of the plan an individual as agent for the service of
legal process, service upon the Secretary shall constitute such service. The
Secretary, not later than 15 days after receipt of service under the preceding
sentence, shall notify the administrator or any trustee of the plan of receipt of such
service.
(2) Any money judgment under this title against an employee benefit plan shall be
enforceable only against the plan as an entity and shall not be enforceable against
any other person unless liability against such person is established in his individual
capacity under this title.
Id. at § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d).
56

Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324-25.

57

Id. at 1325.

58

Id.
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The circuit court first determined Pertec was not a fiduciary.59 When Pertec
hired Self to administer the plan, Pertec no longer retained discretionary control over
the disposition of claims; therefore it was not a fiduciary.60 Pertec and its board of
directors could be held liable for breach of a fiduciary duty for the selection of the
plan administrator because the board of directors selected Self to serve in this
capacity; however, this claim was not brought before the court.61 The court
dismissed the fact that Pertec was labeled “plan fiduciary” in the plan summary
because this label contradicted the plan and a clause in the plan stated the plan
controlled in cases of contradictions.62 In addition, the court found that Pertec was
not a fiduciary despite Pertec employees serving on the Pertec Employees Benefits
Committee.63 The court reasoned that even though the committee had a fiduciary
responsibility in reviewing claims, Pertec was only liable under ERISA when it
exercised the fiduciary responsibility alleged to have been breached.64
Next, the court determined that Self was not a fiduciary.65 The court stated
that Self performed “only administrative functions.”66 Because, in the court‟s
opinion, the company only “process[ed] claims within a framework of policies, rules,
and procedures established by others”, it was not a fiduciary.67
Similarly, in Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan Inc.,68 the Seventh Circuit cited
to Gelardi and held that “„ERISA permits suits to recover benefits only against the
Plan as an entity.‟”69 “Betty Jass participated in an employee benefit plan sponsored
59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996)

69Id.

at 1490 (quoting Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324).
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by her husband‟s employer, Granite City Steel Corporation.”70 Prudential Health
Care (PruCare) administered the plan.71 PruCare employed Karen Margulis, a nurse,
who reviewed Jass‟s condition.72 Jass underwent knee surgery and claimed she
needed physical therapy to rehabilitate her knee.73 Margulis determined therapy was
not needed; therefore Jass was subsequently discharged from the hospital without
rehabilitation.74 Jass sued Margulis for negligence and brought a vicarious liability
claim against PruCare for Margulis‟s alleged negligence.75 The district court
dismissed her claims due to jurisdictional issues and Jass appealed.76
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the lower court‟s dismissal of the claim against
Margulis and upheld the dismissal, but on different grounds.77 The court stated that
Margulis could not be sued in her individual capacity because “„ERISA permits suits
to recover benefits only against the [p]lan as an entity.‟”78 The court also relied on
language in section 1132(d)(2), which limits the ability to sue an individual, to
support its conclusion.79 Section 1132(d)(2) provides that any money judgment will
only be enforceable against the plan and not any other person unless liability against
such a person is established in that person‟s individual capacity.80 Therefore, the
court determined that Margulis was an improper defendant and that “the appropriate
70

Jass, 88 F.3d at 1485.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 1486.

77

Id. at 1490.

78

Id. (quoting Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985)).

Id. (quoting ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2) (2000)) (“Any money judgment under this
subchapter against an employee benefit plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity and
shall not be enforceable against any other person unless liability against such person is established in
his individual capacity under this subchapter.”).
79

80

See language quoted supra note 79.
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defendant for a denial of benefits claim would be the plan, which in this case [was]
PruCare.”81
The Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of the claim against PruCare, but
left room for Jass to amend her complaint.82 The court dismissed the claim because
Jass was seeking compensatory damages which were outside the scope of relief
available under ERISA.83 However, the court re-characterized Jass‟ claim from one
alleging vicarious liability to “one alleging a denial of benefits”, and held that Jass
should be permitted an opportunity to amend her complaint in order to request
appropriate relief.84
In the case of Hemphill v. Unisys Corp.,85 a United States District Court in Utah
also reached the conclusion that only the plan itself could be named as a defendant
in an ERISA action.86 Raymond Hemphill was injured in a car accident87 He had a
contract for health insurance with his employer, Unisys, and a health care provider,
Alta Health Strategies, Inc.88 Hemphill attempted to get his medical bills paid and
applied for long term disability, but some benefits were denied.89 As a result,
Hemphill sued both his employer and his health care provider.90
The district court acknowledged there was a split among the circuit courts as
to whether an employer can be named as a defendant in an ERISA action.91 The
81

Jass, 88 F.3d at 1490.

82

Id. at 1491.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

855 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Utah 1994).

86

Id. at 1234.

87

Id. at 1229.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id. at 1233.
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court observed that “[s]ome courts have summarily held that an employer is not a
proper party defendant in an action to recover benefits.”92 Although other courts
have recognized that a fiduciary may also be an appropriate defendant under ERISA,
the court held there was no evidence to demonstrate Unisys had any control or
influence over the plan.93 As a result, the court stated that Hemphill should amend
his compliant to name only the plan as a defendant in his suit.94
B. The Plan and Plan Administrator Can Be Named
In Garren v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,95 the Eleventh Circuit held
that the proper defendant in an ERISA action was the party that controls
administration of the plan.96 Curtis Garren filed suit after his employment benefit
plan denied his son‟s medical claims.97 John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company (“John Hancock”) serviced the plan, and Georgia-Pacific Corporation
(“Georgia-Pacific”) employed Garren.98 Although Garren brought suit against John
Hancock, the district court dismissed the case after determining the company was
not a proper defendant under ERISA.99
The circuit court upheld the lower court‟s determination that John Hancock
was not the proper defendant because it was not the plan administrator.100 The court
determined that the employer, Georgia-Pacific, was the plan administrator and, thus,
the proper defendant.101 It reached this decision after looking into the role Georgia92

Id.

93

Id. at 1234.

94

Id.

95

114 F.3d 186 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curium).

96

Id. at 187.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.
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Pacific played in granting or denying benefit claims.102 In addition, the Plan itself
named Georgia-Pacific as the plan administrator with exclusive responsibility and
complete discretionary authority to authorize or deny a claim.103 According to the
plan, Georgia-Pacific was to interpret all questions arising under the plan.104 The
circuit court held that an ERISA action should be brought against the plan
administrator who in the case was the employer, Georgia-Pacific.105
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in two
cases, Layes v. Mead Corp.106 and Hall v. LHACO Inc.107 In Layes, Ronnie Layes
suffered from a misalignment of his lower extremities, a condition which was
aggravated by the walking and standing required by his job.108 As a result, Layes filed
a claim under the long-term disability plan provided by his employer.109 Mead
Corporation (“Mead”) was Layes‟s employer,110 and CNA was the administrator of
the long-term disability benefits plan.111 CNA determined that Layes was not totally
disabled and denied him benefits under the plan.112 Subsequently, Layes filed an
ERISA action against both CNA and Mead.113 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants; Layes appealed.114
102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

132 F.3d 1246 (8th Cir. 1998).

107

140 F.3d 1190 (8th Cir. 1998).

108

Layes, 132 F.3d at 1248.

109

Id. at 1249.

110

Id. at 1248.

111

Id. at 1249.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 1248.
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The circuit court upheld the lower court‟s finding that Mead was not a
proper defendant because Mead did not exercise sufficient control over the plan.115
Since CNA was the plan‟s sole administrator “at all relevant times,” it was the proper
defendant.116 Layes argued that Mead attempted to exert control over Layes‟s claim
through a series of letters, memos, and correspondence sent to CNA, thereby
making Mead the plan administrator.117 The court disagreed because the
correspondence primarily took place before Layes filed a formal request for benefits
and did not establish that Mead influenced CNA.118 Thus, CNA was still considered
to be the plan administrator and the proper defendant.119
In Hall, James Hall‟s son was in an accident and Hall submitted a claim under
his health care plan.120 LHACO, the third party administrator, reviewed the claim to
determine if another insurer or a third party might be responsible for payment. 121
Because a third party may have been responsible for Hall‟s claim, LHACO asked
Hall to fill out a subrogation questionnaire.122 Hall refused to complete the
questionnaire, and LHACO never paid his claim.123 Hall sued LHACO after his
claim was denied alleging that LHACO was the plan administrator.124 Although the
district court found that LHACO was the plan administrator, the court determined
that LHACO was an improper defendant and granted LHACO summary
judgment.125 Hall appealed.126
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The circuit court referred to the Eighth Circuit‟s holding in Layes that “the
proper party against whom a claim for ERISA benefits may be brought „is the party
that controls administration of the plan, not the plan participant‟s employer.‟”127 As
a result of the Layes decision, the court found that the district court‟s holding that
LHACO was an improper defendant because it was the plan administrator was
incorrect.128 However, the court found that LHACO could not be held responsible
since it was no longer associated with the plan and could not pay benefits to Hall. 129
The court stated that only a current plan administrator could pay out benefits;
therefore “[t]he terms of Hall‟s [p]lan would necessarily have to be enforced against
the [p]lan itself and the present administrator.”130
In Pippin v. Broadspire Services, Inc.,131 the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana heard Carla Pippin‟s complaints. 132 Pippin was a
disabled employee whose benefits from her employer‟s plan were suddenly
terminated.133
Georgia Gulf employed Pippin, and Broadspire was the claims
134
administrator.
The district court found that summary judgment was improper
because an examination of the role Broadspire played in denying Pippin‟s benefits
claim was necessary to determine if it was a proper party to the suit.135
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C. The Plan and Employer Can Be Named
In Sweet v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp.,136 the Sixth Circuit held that the
employer, Consolidated Aluminum Corp. (“Consolidated”), was a proper
defendant.137 Edward Sweet was a retired employee of Consolidated who was
receiving retirement benefits prior to his death.138 Sweet elected to receive monthly
installment payments for a guaranteed ten year period.139 After Sweet went missing
for a period of time, Manufacturer Hanover Trust, the Trustee of the pension plan,
stopped payment until it could determine whether Sweet had passed away.140 After
Sweet was found to be deceased, the parties agreed to the payment of the amounts
due under the guaranteed ten year period.141 The court awarded prejudgment
interest but refused to award costs and attorney fees to the plaintiff.142 Both parties
appealed.143
The administrator of Sweet‟s estate argued that the award of prejudgment
interest was proper because payments due under the decedent‟s pension plan were
improperly withheld.144 The circuit court examined the relationship between the
employer and the trustee to determine what role, if any, the employer played in the
decision to withhold certain pension benefits owed to the estate.145 The court found
that a letter from the employer to the trustee instructing it not to pay any benefits
until a final determination of death had been made proved that the employer
maintained some control concerning the decision to pay the benefits.146 Because
136
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Consolidated retained some control in the decision-making process, it was a proper
defendant in the suit.147 The court found error in the date used for calculating
prejudgment interest and remanded the case to determine the proper amount of
prejudgment interest.148 Without explaining further, the court upheld the district
court‟s denial of costs and attorney fees.149
Similarly to Sweet, in Curcio v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,150 the
Third Circuit held an employer was a proper defendant in an ERISA action. 151
Frederick Curcio was killed in an automobile accident while employed at a hospital
owned by Capital Health Systems (“Capital Health”).152 Capital Health provided life
insurance coverage to its employees through John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co. (“John Hancock”).153 After collecting some proceeds under the insurance
coverage, Mr. Curcio‟s widow, Marita Curcio, sued both Capital Health and John
Hancock for additional benefits.154 The district court determined that Capital Health
was neither the plan nor a fiduciary and granted summary judgment in favor of
Capital Health; Curcio appealed.155
The circuit court stated that its task was to determine “whether Capital
Health maintained any authority or control over the management of the plan‟s assets,
management of the plan in general, or administration of the plan.”156 The court
relied on section 1002(16)(A)(i) of ERISA, which “defines an „administrator‟ as „the
person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the
147
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plan is operated.‟”157 Capital Health labeled itself as plan administrator in the
employee benefits booklets, and the court stated that it was “obvious . . . that a plan
administrator [had] responsibility in the administration of the plan.”158 The court
also distinguished this case from Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Gelardi because, unlike
the facts in Gelardi, Capital Health did not hire an outside company to administer the
plan.159
The circuit court determined that Capital Health made inaccurate
representations concerning additional recovery that was available under the insurance
company‟s clearly stated policy.160 Capital Health distributed materials describing the
plan to its employees rather than distributing materials provided by John Hancock.161
Capital Health stated in its employee benefit booklet that it could modify, amend, or
terminate the plan at any time.162 The court held that Capital Health “maintained
sufficient discretionary authority and responsibility in the administration of the plan”
to satisfy the statutory definition of a fiduciary under ERISA and make it a proper
party to the claim.163
IV. ANALYSIS
The various schemes governing which parties should be included as
defendants in ERISA claims are fraught with both advantages and disadvantages.
When only a plan can be named as a defendant, employers and plan administrators
have an incentive to deny claims and save money to the detriment of employees. On
the other hand, if anyone who played a role in denying a claim can be named a
defendant, there is a greater incentive to carefully examine claims in an effort to
avoid potential liability.

157

Id. at 234 (quoting ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. §1002(16)(A)(i) (2000)).
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A. Allowing Only the Plan to Be Named
There are both positives and negatives in allowing only the plan to be named
as a defendant in an ERISA action. One advantage of this approach is that it makes
the law clearer for plaintiffs. ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) repeatedly refers to the
plan in connection with bringing a civil action; therefore, suing the plan is consistent
with the statutory language.164
However, there are two disadvantages to naming only the plan as a
defendant. First, this practice may limit the reward a plaintiff is able to receive if a
plan is under-funded. The legislature believed that employees should be protected
from an improperly funded plan, which can be accomplished by allowing plaintiffs to
name parties in addition to the plan as defendants. 165 The second disadvantage is
that other responsible parties will not have an incentive to treat employees fairly if
they cannot be sued. When a claim is denied, the plan saves money and the
employer has to contributes less money to the plan. If only the plan can be sued, the
employer and the plan administrator will have a greater incentive to save money by
denying potentially legitimate claims, knowing they cannot be held responsible for
their decisions.
The Gelardi Court recognized that parties other than the plan could be held
liable for breach of fiduciary duties and refused to find either the employer or the
plan administrator to be a fiduciary.166 Accordingly, the plan was the only proper
defendant.167 The court‟s argument in Gelardi was circular. The court stated that the
employer could not be held responsible as a fiduciary because “it retained no control
over the disposition of claims” after appointing a plan administrator. 168 However,
the court also stated that the plan administrator could be not be held liable because it
was merely performing administrative duties established by others.169 This result is
unfair to plaintiffs. The party who makes the decision to deny a plaintiff benefits
under a plan should have to support its decision when the employee decides to file
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suit. An employer or any other parties involved in an employee benefit plan should
not be “let off the hook” simply by pointing the finger at someone else.
B. Allowing the Plan Administrator to Be Named
There are four strong arguments in favor of permitting plaintiffs to name
plan administrators as defendants. First, the plain language of ERISA permits a plan
administrator to be sued.170 Section 409 of ERISA allows an action to be brought
against a fiduciary.171 The statutory definition of fiduciary includes one who has “any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan.”172 A plan administrator, by job title alone, has responsibility in the
administration of a plan.
Second, if employees are allowed to name a plan administrator who played a
role in the denial of a claim as a defendant, then administrators will have an incentive
to make the right decisions. In a system where only the plan can be named as a
defendant, the incentive to deny claims outweighs the incentive to approve them.
When claims are denied, the employer saves money by contributing less money to
the plan. Furthermore, because the employer chooses and pays the plan
administrator, the employer‟s wishes may influence the plan administrator. No
accountability exists if the plan administrator erroneously denies a claim and cannot
be sued; therefore, the administrator has an incentive to err on the side of denying
claims. Exposing plan administrators to liability may tip the incentives in favor of
the employees.
Third, allowing employees to sue a third party plan administrator may ensure
that those plan administrators take their duty to employees more seriously. Third
party plan administrators may not believe they have loyalties to employees since they
are only involved with them through the administration of the plan. But, if
employees who are harmed by the decisions of plan administrators are able to sue
them, plan administrators will remember that they handle employees claims carefully
and fairly.
The fourth argument in support of naming plan administrators as defendants
favors employers. If a third party administers the plan and the employer plays no
170

ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
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role in the denial or granting of benefits, then the employer should not be named as
a defendant, thus, saving the employer from a potentially costly lawsuit.
The disadvantage to allowing plan administrators to be named as defendants
is that it may deter third parties from administering benefit plans. If third parties are
not willing to administer plans, this may place a heavy burden on employers to
administer plans themselves, which may ultimately cause companies to not create
plans in the first place.
C. Allowing the Employer to Be Named
An employer should be named as a defendant in an ERISA action if it
participated in the decision of whether to grant or deny a benefit. The advantage to
being able to name an employer as a defendant in a claim for ERISA benefits is that
it holds accountable a party who may have done wrong. One purpose behind
ERISA was to sanction responsible parties.173 An employer is usually responsible in
some manner for decisions made under the plan; therefore, it should be held
accountable. An employer should not be able to create an employee benefit plan,
take part in making decisions under that plan, and then hide behind the plan when
something goes wrong.
In Varity v. Howe,174 the Supreme Court held that ERISA authorized a lawsuit
for individualized equitable relief when an employer breached a fiduciary
obligation.175 This case demonstrates that the Supreme Court does not interpret
ERISA as narrowly as the court in the Gelardi. Although Gelardi may not have dealt
with an employer‟s actions that were as severe as in Varity, it is unlikely that the
Gelardi court would have found any party to be a fiduciary. If the employer was not a
fiduciary because it had delegated duties to a plan administrator, 176 and the plan
administrator was not a fiduciary because it was merely following rules established by
the employer,177 then it is difficult to imagine who the Gelardi Court would consider a
fiduciary. Accordingly, Gelardi is inconsistent with the Supreme Court‟s decision in
Varity that fiduciaries should be held accountable.
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Similarly to the disadvantage of allowing the plan administrator to be named,
the disadvantage of allowing plan participants to sue employers is that this may
discourage employers from creating benefit plans in the first place.
D. Proposal
The better-reasoned approach would allow an ERISA plan participant who
files an ERISA action to name as defendants all parties who played a role in the
denial of a claim, including the plan itself, the employer who sponsored the plan, and
the plan administrator. Allowing parties other than the plan to be named as a
defendant results in greater accountability. In addition, this approach is consistent
with the language of the ERISA legislation, the intent behind the legislation, and the
Supreme Court‟s opinion in Varity. The statutory language in ERISA allows suits to
be brought against the plan and against fiduciaries. Fiduciary should be interpreted
broadly to include employers and plan administrators who play a role in denying an
employee benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
The proper defendant in an ERISA action is any party that plays a role in the
denial of a claim under an ERISA plan. These parties may include the plan, the
employer who sponsored the plan, the plan administrator, and anyone else involved
in deciding to deny a benefit to an employee. Four primary bases support this
supposition.
First, the plain language of the statute permits a plaintiff to sue the plan and
fiduciaries. Fiduciaries are defined, in part, as those who administer the plan.178 A
plan administrator obviously fits that description, as does an employer who plays a
role in administrating the plan. However, an employer who plays no role in plan
administration should not be subject to suit.
Second, allowing plaintiffs to name all parties who played a role in the denial
of a claim as defendants is consistent with the legislative intent of Congress in
creating ERISA. One purpose of ERISA was to protect employees from improperly
funded plans and erroneous benefit denials.179 Broadening the category of entities
that may be sued for erroneous benefit denials would accomplish both of these
purposes.
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Third, this approach is consistent with the Supreme Court decision in Varity
recognizing that fiduciaries can be sued under ERISA.180 Entities making benefit
decisions, whether employers or plan administrators, are fiduciaries who can and
should be held accountable for their decisions.
Fourth, this approach places the proper incentives on parties making benefits
determinations to make the correct decisions. If the decision-maker cannot be held
liable, then the decision-maker, whether employer or plan administrator, will have a
direct financial incentive to deny legitimate claims. Making decision-makers liable
ensures they have an incentive to make proper benefits determinations.
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